Key Takeaways:
- De-identification is the process of removing or obscuring personal health information in medical records to protect patient privacy.
- De-identification is critical for enabling the sharing of data for secondary research purposes such as public health studies while meeting privacy regulations like HIPAA.
- Common de-identification techniques include suppression, generalization, perturbation and synthetic data generation.
- There is often a balance between data utility and privacy risk that must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis when de-identifying data.
- Emerging privacy-enhancing computation methods like federated learning and differential privacy offer complementary approaches to de-identification.
What is De-identification and Why is it Important for Healthcare?
Patient health information is considered highly sensitive data in need of privacy protections. However medical data sharing enables critically important research on public health, personalized medicine and more. De-identification techniques that remove identifying information and decrease the risk of exposing protected health information serve a crucial role in balancing these needs for privacy and innovation.
Definitions and Concepts
The HIPAA Privacy Rule defines de-identification as the process of preventing a person’s identity from being connected with health information. Once data has been de-identified per the Privacy Rule’s standards, it is no longer considered protected health information (PHI) and can be freely shared for research use cases like public health studies, therapeutic effectiveness studies and medical informatics analytics.
Perfect de-identification that carries no risk of re-identification of patients is very difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish with current technology. As a result, regulations like HIPAA allow for formal designations of “de-identified” health data based on achieving sufficient pseudonymity through the suppression or generalization of identifying tag elements. HIPAA also defines a limited data set containing certain scrubbed identifiers that can be shared with a data use agreement rather than fully stripped identifiers.
The re-identification risk spectrum ranges from blatant identifiers like names, home addresses and social security numbers to quasi-identifiers like birthdates and narrowed locations that would not directly name the patient but could be pieced together to deduce identity in combination, especially as external data sources grow more public over time. State-of-the-art de-identification evaluates both blatant and quasi-identifier risks to minimize traceability while maximizing analytic utility.
Motivating Use Cases
Research and public health initiatives rely on the sharing of de-identified health data to drive progress on evidence and outcomes. The Cancer Moonshot’s data sharing efforts highlight the massive potential impact of medical databases, cohorts and real-world evidence generation on accelerating cures via de-identified data aggregation and analytics. The open FDA program demonstrates governmental encouragement of privacy-respecting access to regulatory datasets to inform digital health entrepreneurs. Patient matching in these fragmented healthcare datasets would be impossible using directly identifiable data. Apple’s ResearchKit and CareKit frameworks facilitate de-identified mobile health data sharing for app developers to build new participatory research applications.
Data marketplaces and trusted third parties are emerging to certify and exchange research-ready, consented data assets like clinico-genomic data underlying scientific publications and clinical trials. Startups and health systems manage data sharing agreements and audit logs around distributed sites leveraging de-identified data. Rich metadata combined with privacy-preserving record linkage techniques that avoid direct identifiers enables specific patient subgroup analytics without compromise.
Overall research efficiency improves when more participants openly share their health data. But none of this research progress would be possible if stringent de-identification practices were not implemented to earn patient trust in data sharing.
De-Identification Techniques and Standards
There are two high level categories of common de-identification protocols in healthcare: 1) suppressing blatant identifiers, typically following frameworks like HIPAA, and 2) actively transforming the data itself through various forms of generalization, perturbation or synthetic data production.
Suppressing Identifiers
The HIPAA Privacy Rule designates 18 categories of Protected Health Information identifiers that must be removed to achieve de-identified status, including names, geographic details narrower than state level, all dates other than years, contact information, IDs and record numbers, vehicle and device identifiers, URLs, IP addresses, biometrics etc.
Messages, images and unstructured data require specialized redaction processes to scrub both blatant and quasi-identifiers related to the patient, provider, institution or researchers involved. Named entity recognition and text annotation techniques help automate the detection of identifiable concepts. Voice data and video are more challenging mediums to de-identify.
Generalization and Aggregation
When formal dates, locations, ages over 89 and other quasi-identifiers cannot be completely suppressed without losing analytic value from the structured data, generalization techniques help band these details into abstract categories to preserve some descriptive statistics while hiding individual values.
Aggregating masked data across many patient records also prevents isolation of individuals. Row level de-identification risks in sparse data featuring outliers and uncommon combinations of traits can be mitigated by pooling data points into broader summaries before release rather than allowing raw access.
Perturbation
Perturbation encompasses a wide array of mathematical and statistical data alteration techniques that aim to distort the original data values and distributions while maintaining the general trends and correlations warranting analysis.
Value distortion methods include quantization to normalize numbers into ranges, squeezing and stretching value dispersion, rounding or truncating decimals, swapping similar records and discretizing continuous variables. Objects can be clustered into groups that are then analyzed in aggregate. Multiple perturbed versions of the dataset can be safely released to enable reproducible confirmation of discovered associations while avoiding leakage of the precise source data.
Combinations of generalization and perturbation provide flexibility for particular data types and contexts. The strengths, weaknesses and tuning of parameters merit a technical deep dive. The key is calibrating perturbation to maximize analytic integrity while minimizing correlation risk. Ongoing access rather than static publication also allows refinement of data treatment to meet evolving security assumptions and privacy regulations.
Synthetic Data
Synthetic datasets represent an emerging approach for modeling realistic artificial data distributions that resemble an actual patient group without containing the original records. Once the statistical shape of data properties is learned from the genuine dataset, simulated synthetic data can be sampled from generative models that emulate plausible features and relationships without allowing deduction of the real samples.
The underlying models must sufficiently capture multidimensional interactions and representation of minority groups within the patient population. Features such as ethnicity, outcomes, treatments and behaviors must be appropriately represented instead of using simplistic or biased summary statistics that ignore important correlations. Synthetic data techniques applying machine learning and differential privacy mechanisms to reconstruct distributions show significant promise for shared data sandbox environments. Cloud vendors like AWS, Google Cloud and Microsoft Azure now provide synthetic data services.
Evaluating the Risk-Utility Tradeoff
Ideally, de-identified health data removes enough identifying risk to prevent adversaries from recognizing individuals while retaining enough fidelity to offer scientific utility for the intended analyses by qualified researchers. But optimizing both privacy protection and analytic value requires navigating technical and ethical nuances around plausible re-identification vulnerabilities and scenarios balanced against access restrictions on derivative insights in the public interest.
Quantitative statistical metrics like k-anonymity models attempt to mathematically define anonymity sets with at least k records containing a combination of quasi-identifiers to avoid isolation. L-diversity metrics further generalize and dilute these groups to limit confidence of guessing the matching identity. Closeness measures how much perturbation may have altered correlations. Quantifying information loss helps data curators shape treatment processes and inclusion of synthetic records. Interpreting these model-based metrics requires understanding their assumptions and limitations with respect to adversary means and background knowledge.
More meaningful measures account for qualitative harms of identity traceability for affected groups based on socioeconomic status, minority populations, immigration factors, substance history, abuse status, disability needs and other cultural contexts that influence vulnerability irrespective of mathematical protections. Trusted access policies should offer options for verifiable rationale when requesting clearer data from data stewards who can evaluate situational sensitivity factors.
Overall responsibility falls upon custodial institutions and data safe havens to conduct contextual integrity assessments ensuring fair data flows to legitimate purposes. This means formally evaluating both welfare impacts on individuals and excluded populations, as well as potential data misuses or manipulative harms at population scale, such as discriminatory profiling. Updated governance mechanisms must address modern re-identification realities and connective threats.
Future Directions
Traditional de-identification practices struggle with handling high-dimensional, heterogeneous patient profiles across accumulating data types, modalities, apps, sensors, workflows and research studies. While valuable on their own, these techniques may fail to fully protect individuals as the ubiquity of digital traces multiplies potential quasi-identifiers. Absolute anonymity also severely limits permissible models and computations.
Emerging areas like federated analytics and differential privacy relax the goal of total de-identification by keeping raw records secured on distributed data servers and only allowing mathematical summaries to be queried from a central service so that statistical patterns can be discovered from many sites without exposing actual inputs from any one site. Legally defined LIMITED DATA SETS similarly bridge consented data access with managed identity risks for pre-vetted analysts.
Differentially private computations introduce mathematically calibrated noise to guarantee that the presence or sensitive attributes tied to any one patient will be masked across many patients. This masking allows research insights to be uncovered without revealing individual contributions. Secure multiparty computation and homomorphic encryption also enable certain restricted computations like aggregates, means and distributions executed on sensitive inputs while keeping the underlying data encrypted.
Such cryptographic methods and privacy-enhancing technologies provide complementary assurances to traditional de-identification practices. But governance, interpretation and usability remain active areas of improvement to fulfill ethical promises in practice. Holistic data safe havens must align emerging privacy-preserving computation capabilities with rigorous curation, context-based de-identification protocols and trust-based oversight mechanisms that can demonstrably justify public interest usages while preventing tangible harms to individuals and communities whose sensitive data fuels research.
Sources:
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/special-topics/de-identification/index.html
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0234962
https://www.cancer.gov/research/key-initiatives/moonshot-cancer-initiative
